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PARTING THE WAVES: 
CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTION AND  





This article casts aside traditional obsessions and examines the development and 
present state of coastal State claims to maritime jurisdiction, the overlapping 
claims to maritime space that have inevitably resulted from the significant 





 Open the pages of an atlas and one is faced with the familiar network of 
lines, often depicted with bold, red symbols, indicating the network of international 
boundaries that serve to define the territorial limits of States.  This is far from the 
case offshore, however.  Indeed, cartographic illustrations of the political map of the 
world rarely show boundary lines at sea.  This is something of an oddity as not only 
do the oceans comprise the majority (around 72%) of the surface of the planet, but 
coastal State rights over maritime space have evolved and extended over time such 
that they now encompass an area comparable to the world’s land territory. 
 
 This article examines the development and present state of coastal State 
claims to maritime jurisdiction, the overlapping claims to maritime space that have 
inevitably resulted from the significant extension of maritime claims in recent 
decades, and thus the delimitation of maritime boundaries.  It is suggested that while 
considerable progress has been made in relation to the definition of maritime 
                                                 
*  Professor Clive Schofield is the Director of Research and ARC Future Fellow at the 
Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources & Security (ANCORS).  He is a political geographer 
specialising in international boundaries and particularly maritime boundary delimitation.  He holds a 
Ph.D. in Geography from the University of Durham, UK and also holds an LL.M. in international law 
from the University of British Columbia.  The central theme of his research can be summarised as the 
examination of the intersection of geographical/technical, legal and political disciplines in the law of 
the sea with particular reference to maritime boundary delimitation.  The core objective of his past 
and present academic activity is to make a constructive, substantial and lasting practical contribution 
to the resolution of maritime jurisdictional disputes. 





boundaries and a clearer approach to maritime delimitation has emerged from recent 
cases considered by international courts and tribunals, significant sources of 
uncertainty remain.  Consequentially, it will be some considerable time before the 
kind of comprehensive network of international boundary lines that we are used to 
on land, will be evident offshore. 
 
I.  EXPANDING MARITIME JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS 
  
 An enduring theme in the development of the international regime relating to 
the oceans has been the tension between the pressure from coastal States towards 
advancing national claims over the maritime spaces off their coasts and the concept 
of the freedom of the seas, and in particular freedom of navigation, for all States.  
These competing views are often associated with the classic works of Hugo Grotius 
who published Mare Liberum (Freedom of the Seas)1 in 1609,2 and John Selden’s 
opposing view, Mare Clausum (Closed Seas), published in 1635.3  On the one hand 
Grotius argued that “no ocean can be the property of a nation because it is 
impossible for any nation to take it into possession by occupation” and that for a 
State to attempt to do so would be contrary to the laws of nature.  Selden, in 
contrast, provided an early articulation of the concept of State sovereignty over the 
oceans.4 
 
 For a long period, the demand for freedom of the seas in the interests of 
ensuring global trade prevailed, with the broad consensus being that coastal State 
rights should be restricted to a narrow coastal belt of territorial waters whose 
maximum breadth was not specifically defined through international agreement but 
was generally thought not to extend more than three nautical miles (nm)5 offshore in 
                                                 
1  HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE 
DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE (The Lawbook Exchange 2001) (translated with 
a revision of the Latin text of 1633 by R. Van Deman Magoffin, Division of International Law, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).  First published as Chapter 12 of De Indis [The Indies], 
available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Fperso 
n=3775&Itemid=28.  
2  “Hugo Grotius” is the commonly used anglicised version of the Dutch “Huig de Groot.”  
With apologies to de Groot, the anglicised version is used here. 
3  First published in Latin as JOHN SELDEN, “MARE CLAUSUM SEU DE DOMINO MARIS,” 
republished as “OF THE DOMINION, OR, OWNERSHIP OF THE SEA,” translated into English and set 
forth with some [sic] additional evidences and discourses by Marchmont Nedham (London: William 
Du-Gard, by appointment of the Council of State, 1652) (reprinted Lawbook Exchange 2004). 
4  It is notable that both authors’ views reflected national interests – Grotius in support of 
the position of his client, the Dutch East India Company, while Selden had been charged with 
defending the interests of the British Crown over the seas surrounding the British Isles.  See ROBIN 
CHURCHILL AND VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 4 (Manchester University Press, 3rd ed. 
1999). 
5  It is acknowledged that technically “nm” denotes nanometres rather than nautical miles, 
for which the correct abbreviation is “M.”  However, “M” is often taken to mean metres and “nm” is 
widely used as an abbreviation for nautical miles in this article.  It is also worth pointing out that “nm” 
is used for nautical miles by authorities such as the United Nations Office of Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea. 
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accordance with the so-called “cannon shot rule.”6  While efforts were made towards 
the codification of the international law of the sea, for example the Hague 
Conference on the Codification of International Law of 1930, little progress had 
been achieved by the mid-Twentieth Century.  Substantial changes, however, were 
afoot with more and more States advancing expansive maritime jurisdictional claims 
– a phenomenon generally termed “creeping coastal State jurisdiction.” 
 
A.  Creeping Coastal State Jurisdiction 
 
 A 1945 United States Presidential Proclamation, Policy of the United States With 
Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, often 
termed the Truman Proclamation, 7  is generally regarded as a key catalyst for the 
expansion of coastal State claims to maritime jurisdiction further offshore.  The 
Truman Proclamation was not, however, the first move to advance claims to maritime 
areas beyond the territorial sea.  Notable developments in this regard include the 
division and subsequent annexation of the seabed of the Gulf of Paria between the 
United Kingdom (on behalf of Trinidad and Tobago) and Venezuela in 1942,8 and 
Argentina’s continental shelf Decree of 1944.9  Nonetheless, the Truman Proclamation 
was especially influential given that it was the United States taking this bold step.  In 
September 1945, U.S. President Truman issued a pair of Presidential Proclamations 
relating to maritime areas seaward of the United States’ territorial sea limits (at that 
time set at three nautical miles).  The Proclamation relating to the continental shelf, 
stated that “the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of 
the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous 
to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its 
jurisdiction and control.”10 
 
 The Truman Proclamation was explicitly resource-oriented, highlighting the 
“long range world-wide need for new sources of petroleum and other minerals” and 
their probable presence beneath “many parts” of the continental shelf off the coasts 
of the United States, together with the technological developments to make their 
recovery practicable, either at the time or in the near future.11  Jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf was claimed in order to ensure the “conservation and prudent 
                                                 
6  The cannon shot rule purportedly equated to the distance a cannon could throw a ball, as 
proposed by the Dutch in negotiations with the English as early as 1610.  See CLYDE SANGER, 
ORDERING THE OCEANS: THE MAKING OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 12 (1986). 
7  See Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 1943-1948 Comp., p. 67 (Sept. 28, 1945), 3 EDWARD 
DUNCAN BROWN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 113 (1994).  
8  See 1 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, 639-654 (Jonathan Charney & Lewis 
Alexander eds., 1993).  It is, however, worth noting in the present context that Article 5 of the treaty 
provides that the agreement refers “solely to the submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria, and nothing 
herein shall be held to affect in any way the status of the islands, islets or rocks above the surface of 
the sea together with the territorial waters thereof.”  Id. at 653. 
9  The first explicit claim to coastal State jurisdiction over the continental shelf, termed the 
“epicontinental sea” of Argentina.  See Decree No.1, 385 Concerning Mineral Reserves, Jan. 24, 1944, 
Boletin Oficial de la Republica Argentina, Vol.52, no.14, 853 in Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the 
High Seas, U.N.Doc ST/LEG/SER.B/1, (Mar. 17 1944). 
10  Proclamation 2667, Sep. 28, 1945, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948). 
11  Id. 





utilization” of such resources, as development took place, and on security grounds, 
with “self-preservation” compelling the coastal nation to “keep close watch over 
activities off its shores.” 12   The exercise of jurisdiction over continental shelf 
resources by the “contiguous nation” was presented as “reasonable and just” on the 
basis that efforts to utilise or conserve such resources would rely upon “cooperation 
and protection from shore” and because “the continental shelf may be regarded as 
the extension of the land mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant 
to it,” which seems to represent an alternative way of saying ‘natural prolongation,’ 
with the resources in question frequently forming “a seaward extension of a pool or 
deposit lying within its territory.”13  The Truman Proclamation did, however, include a 
clear statement that “[t]he character as high seas of the waters above the continental 
shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus 
affected.” 14   The United States similarly claimed the right to designate fishery 
conservation zones in the high seas beyond American-claimed territorial sea.15  
 
 Once sown, the seeds of extended maritime jurisdiction, covering the living 
and non-living resources of both the seabed and water column swiftly came to 
germination.  These developments led an increasing number of States to advance 
claims to maritime jurisdiction over areas significantly further offshore than had 
previously been the case.  Of particular note, a number of Latin American countries 
proceeded to claim sovereignty over both seabed and water column up to 200nm 
offshore – prompting diplomatic protests from the United States, United Kingdom, 
and others.16   The profusion of extended claims to maritime jurisdiction, largely 
sparked by the Truman Proclamation, led to a clear need to clarify and codify the 
international law of the sea respecting maritime jurisdictional rights and obligations. 
 
B.  Order for the Oceans? 
 
 As noted above, early efforts to codify the international law of the sea proved 
unsuccessful.  Therefore, a renewed effort was mounted in the post-World War II 
period.  In particular, the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS I), which took place in Geneva in 1958, yielded four Conventions17 – the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,18 the Convention on the 
                                                 
12  Id. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  It is notable, however, that the fisheries proclamation refers to the regulation and control 
of fishing and offers to enter into agreements with other States as opposed to the continental shelf 
proclamation, which claims “jurisdiction and control.”  Reproduced in (1946) 40 American Journal of 
International Law Supplement 45. 
16  For example, in a joint declaration dating from 1952, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru asserted 
their “sole sovereignty and jurisdiction over the area of sea adjacent to the coast . . . and extending not 
less than 200 nautical miles from the said coast.”  Peru and Chile, Maritime Boundary: Chile-Peru, 
OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, US DEP’T OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEA (July 2, 1979). 
17  Collectively these Conventions are often termed the “Geneva Conventions” or the “1958 
Conventions” [hereinafter the 1958 Conventions]. 
18  Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 
[hereinafter CTSCZ]. 
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Continental Shelf,19  the Convention on the High Seas, 20  and the Convention on 
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Sea.21 
 
 Despite the significant progress that the 1958 Conventions represented, 
uncertainty still prevailed concerning the limits of maritime claims.  For example, 
consensus on the breadth of the territorial sea was lacking at UNCLOS I.  
Agreement on the contentious issue of territorial sea limits proved to be just out of 
reach at the conclusion of the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS II) of 1960 with agreement on a formula of a 6nm territorial sea with 
a 6nm fishing zone seaward failing to secure the necessary two-thirds majority for 
adoption by a single vote.  Moreover, the breadth of the continental shelf under the 
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf was less than specific.  Article 1 of the 
Convention provides for continental shelf limits coinciding with either a depth of 
200m or, beyond that limit, to a depth where exploitation of resources was 
possible. 22   This suggested, rather unsatisfactorily, that the outer limits of the 
continental shelf were potentially subject to change over time as improvements in 
offshore resource exploitation technology allowed for the extraction of seabed 
resources in deeper waters, further offshore. 
 
 These shortcomings led to the convening of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) commencing in 1973, which 
resulted in the drafting of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(LOSC) in 1982.  A key achievement of LOSC was the definition of clear spatial 
limits for national claims to maritime jurisdiction, something that had, as noted 
above, eluded earlier codification efforts.  
 
 Under LOSC an agreement was reached on 12nm as the maximum breadth 
of the territorial sea.23  LOSC also provides for a contiguous zone out to 24nm from 
relevant baselines. 24   Additionally, and significantly, the concept of the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) gained general international acceptance at the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and an agreement was 
reached on the breadth of the EEZ at 200nm.  Concerning the continental shelf, 
complex criteria were laid down in Article 76 of LOSC whereby the outer limits of 
the continental shelf may be determined in partnership with a scientific and technical 
                                                 
19  Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. 
20  Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11. 
21  Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Sea, Apr. 
29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.  
   22  Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, at art. 1. 
23  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter LOSC]. Article 3 provides that every State has the right to establish the breadth of the 
territorial sea “up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles,” measured from baselines determined in 
accordance with the Convention.  See id. at art. 3.  Article 4 further states that the outer limit of the 
territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline 
equal to the breadth of the territorial sea.”  See id. at art. 4. 
24  Id. at art. 33.  





body established through the Convention – the United Nations Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).25 
 
 LOSC has gained widespread international recognition and at the time of 
writing there were 162 parties to it.26  A notable absentee from the list of States 
parties to LOSC is the United States.  Nonetheless, the United States accepts that 
much of LOSC, including the maritime jurisdictional and boundary delimitation 
provisions, is declaratory of customary international law and conducts its policy 
accordingly.27  For parties to the Convention, it provides the binding legal framework 
governing maritime jurisdictional claims and the delimitation of maritime boundaries 
between national maritime zones.  Indeed, those parts of the Convention dealing 
with maritime claims and maritime boundary delimitation can be considered 
declaratory of customary international law. 
 
 In this context it can be observed that States codified the international law of 
the sea and, therefore unsurprisingly, the law accords States the primary role.  Thus, 
only States can advance maritime claims28 and such a State requires land territory and 
a coastline in order to make such claims.29 
 
C.  The Increasing Scope of Maritime Claims 
 
 The vast majority of coastal States have proved to be enthusiastic claimants 
in terms of maritime jurisdictional zones.30  These claims have largely proven to be in 
conformity with international norms with most coastal States claiming 12nm breadth 
territorial seas and 200nm EEZs.  Therefore, the maritime political map of the world 
is relatively stable, at least in terms of the geographic scope of maritime claims, with 
                                                 
25   See U.N. Comm’n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf website, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm [hereinafter CLCS]. 
26  Comprising 161 states plus the European Community. 
27   J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE 
MARITIME CLAIMS 4-6 (1996).  
28  This is implicit from the terms and language of the Convention.  For example, among the 
few definitions of terms provided in Article 1 of LOSC, “States Parties” is defined as “States which 
have consented to be bound by this Convention and for which this Convention is in force.”  LOSC, 
supra note 23, at art. 1.  Moreover, regarding claims to maritime zones of jurisdiction, States are given 
an exclusive role with Article 2 of LOSC dealing with the territorial sea providing that “[t]he 
sovereignty of a coastal State extends ….”  Similar language prevails in respect of the other types of 
maritime zones covered by LOSC.  LOSC, supra note 23, at art. 2. 
29   Possession of land territory and a coastline are prerequisites for claims to maritime 
jurisdiction.  As Prosper Weil has observed: “. . . the land dominates the sea and it dominates it by the 
intermediary of the coastal front.”  See PROSPER WEIL, THE LAW OF MARITIME DELIMITATION - 
REFLECTIONS 50 (1989). 
30  See U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS & THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, 
Table of Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction (2008) available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summary_of_
claims.pdf. 
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few “excessive” claims in terms of their breadth remaining because many past claims 
that were not in accordance with the terms of LOSC have been “rolled back.”31  
 
 The introduction of 200nm breadth EEZs, in particular, has had a dramatic 
impact on the scope of ocean spaces becoming subject to the maritime claims of 
coastal States.  It has been estimated that, should every coastal State make national 
maritime jurisdictional claims out to 200nm (as is predominantly the case), these 
claims would encompass 43 million square nautical miles (147 million square 
kilometres) of maritime space.  This amounts to approximately 41% of the area of 
the oceans or 29% of the Earth’s surface.  The extent of the area subject to 
jurisdictional claims out to 200nm is thus approximately equivalent to the area of 
land territory on the surface of the Earth.32  This vast extension of maritime areas 
subject to coastal State sovereign rights inevitably offers both great opportunities, 
especially in terms of access to marine resources, but also significant management 
and oceans governance challenges.  For example, in 1984 the United Nations (UN) 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimated that 90% of marine fish and 
shellfish were caught within 200nm of the coast.33  Similarly, it was estimated that 
87% of the world’s known submarine oil deposits would fall within the 200nm 
breadth zones of jurisdiction.34  Consequently, the drafting of LOSC and widespread 
claiming of 200nm EEZs represents a profound reallocation of resource rights from 
international to national jurisdiction.  Realising the opportunities raised by these 
extended maritime jurisdictional claims, notably protecting and managing marine 
resources and activities, is, however, undoubtedly a challenging task.  This task is 
made all the harder given the jurisdictional uncertainty caused by undefined maritime 
boundaries and competing claims to maritime jurisdiction. 
 
D.  The Last Great Scramble?  
 
 The enormous extension of coastal State rights offshore is not yet complete.  
In particular, the outer limits of continental shelf areas extending seawards of the 
200nm limit of the EEZ have yet to be finalised.  In contrast to the open-ended 
situation under the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Article 76(1) of 
LOSC establishes that a coastal state’s continental shelf right can extend to 200nm 
from baselines or “throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the 
outer edge of the continental margin.”  Thus, where continental margins are broader 
than 200nm, coastal States may assert their sovereign rights over those parts of the 
continental shelf forming part of their natural prolongation but are located beyond 
their 200nm EEZ limit.  Article 76 goes on to provide a complex series of formulae 
through which the coastal State can establish the outer limit of its continental shelf, 
                                                 
31  See ROACH & SMITH, supra note 27.  Whilst most “excessive” territorial sea claims have 
been “rolled back” to the international norm of 12nm, a number of coastal States retain claims to 
200nm territorial seas (Benin, Congo (Brazzaville), Ecuador, Peru, and Somalia).  See id.  
32  Personal Communication with Philip A. Symonds, Senior Adviser – Law of the Sea at 
Geoscience Australia (July 2011); J.R.VICTOR PRESCOTT & CLIVE SCHOFIELD, THE MARITIME 
POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 9 (2005). 
33   R. Schurman, Tuna Dreams: Resource Nationalism and the Pacific Island’s Tuna Industry, 29 
DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, 107 (1998). 
34  CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 4, at 162.  





seaward of the 200nm limit.  Essentially, Article 76 provides two formulae according 
to which coastal States can establish the existence of a continental margin beyond the 
200nm limit which forms part of the State’s natural prolongation 35  and two 
maximum constraints, or ‘cut-off’ lines.36 
 
 While it is recognised that coastal State rights to the continental shelf are 
inherent,37 the outer limits of such areas, which are generally termed the ‘outer’ or 
‘extended’ continental shelf, can only be determined following a submission of 
information to the relevant United Nations technical and scientific body, the United 
Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). 38   It is 
abundantly clear that the CLCS has an enormous task facing it to assist States in 
finalising their outer continental shelf limits.  A surge in submissions occurred 
because of a deadline applicable to many coastal States in May 2009.39  As a result the 
number of submissions lodged with the Commission rapidly increased from 11 a 
year prior to the deadline to over 50 immediately after it (59 at the time of writing), 
together with over 40 (currently 45) submissions of preliminary information on outer 
continental shelf limits.40  Given the Commission’s present consideration rate of 
around two years per submission it is clear that, even allowing for up to three sub-
commissions operating in parallel, finalisation of the outer limits of the continental 
shelf and thus definition of the exact extent of extended continental shelf areas is a 
process that will be measured in decades.  Although the assertions being made by 
coastal States located on broad continental margins to outer continental shelf rights 
beyond 200nm from their coasts appear to represent further ‘creeping coastal State 
jurisdiction,’ it can be argued that in reality this is not the case as coastal States are 
working within and abiding by the mechanism established under LOSC, as evidenced 
by the submissions made to the CLCS.  These submissions collectively encompass an 
                                                 
35   These are either the “Gardiner Line”, based on reference to depth or thickness of 
sedimentary rocks overlying the continental crust, or the “Hedberg Line” which uses a distance 
formula of 60nm.  Both entitlement formulae are measured from the foot of the continental slope, 
which is defined as the point of maximum change in gradient at the base of the continental slope 
(unless there is “evidence to the contrary”).  See LOSC supra note 23, at art. 76(4)(b) Whichever of the 
formulae is most advantageous to the coastal State may be used. 
36  Either a distance of 350nm from relevant baselines or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 
metre isobaths (depth contour).  Again, whichever of the formulae is most advantageous to the 
coastal State may be used.  See LOSC supra note 23, at art. 76(5). 
37  Continental shelf rights “do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any 
express proclamation.”  LOSC supra note 23, at art. 77(3). 
38  See CLCS, supra note 25. 
39  The original deadline for submissions to the CLCS was set at “10 years of the entry into 
force of this Convention for that State.”  LOSC supra note 23, at art. 4 annex II, (LOSC, Annex II, 
Article 4).  However it became clear that many interested States would be unable to fulfill this 
deadline so it was pushed back to 13 May 2009 – ten years after the Commission adopted its scientific 
and technical guidelines. 
40  In a further move to address the concerns of those States struggling to meet the (revised) 
deadline for submissions, in June 2008 a meeting of the states’ parties to the Law of the Sea agreed to 
allow submissions of preliminary information to be made in order to stop the 10 year clock for 
submissions.  See Decision of the Eighteenth Meeting of State Parties, SPLOS/183, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/meeting_states_parties/SPLOS_documents.htm. 
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enormous area, in excess of 30 million square kilometres, of continental shelf located 
seawards of the 200 nautical mile limit from coastal baselines.41 
 
II.  DIVIDING THE WORLD’S OCEANS 
 
 The inevitable consequence of the enormous expansion in national claims to 
maritime space seawards has been a major proliferation in overlapping claims to 
maritime jurisdiction and thus potential international maritime boundaries.  Whereas 
the limited scope of the maritime claims of coastal States in the past meant that the 
need for maritime boundaries was similarly restricted, this is clearly no longer the 
case.  Instead, the expanded spatial scope of maritime claims means that States far 
separated from one another now potentially may have overlapping maritime claims 
and therefore the need to delimit a maritime boundary between them.  
 
 As EEZ claims are now commonplace, States with coasts up to 400nm 
distant from one another may share a potential maritime boundary.  Moreover, as 
continental shelf rights may extend beyond 200nm from baselines, States even 
further removed from one another may require a seabed boundary to be delimited.  
Indeed, of the estimated 30 million square kilometres of potential extended 
continental shelf areas subject to submissions to the CLCS mentioned above, over 
2.7 million square kilometres of continental shelf areas beyond 200nm from the 
coast are subject to overlapping submissions.42  Just as overlapping maritime claims, 
and thus potential maritime boundaries, have multiplied, so too have maritime 
jurisdictional and boundary disputes.  Again, this is perhaps inevitable given the 
tendency for States to try to maximise their own maritime entitlements. 
Although significant progress has been made in terms of the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries worldwide,43 there remains a long way to go before a comprehensive 
network of agreed maritime boundaries and limits is achieved.  Indeed, less than half 
of the potential maritime boundaries around the world have been delimited. 44  
Moreover, many of the maritime boundary agreements that have been concluded are 
partial or incomplete in character – for instance, only covering part of the length of 
the potential maritime boundary or dealing with only continental shelf rights rather 





                                                 
41  Robert Van de Poll & Clive Schofield, “A Seabed Scramble: A Global Overview of 
Extended Continental Shelf Submissions”, paper presented at the Advisory Board on the Law of the 
Sea (ABLOS) conference on Contentious Issues in UNCLOS – Surely Not?, International Hydrographic 
Bureau Monaco, 25-27 October 2010. 
42  Id. 
43  See 1-2 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Jonathan Charney & Lewis Alexander 
eds., 1993); 3 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Jonathan Charney & Lewis Alexander, eds., 
1998); 4 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Jonathan Charney, & Robert Smith eds., 2002); 5 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Robert Smith and David Colson eds., 2005); 6 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Robert Smith and David Colson eds., 2011). 
44   Clive Schofield, The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries: An Incomplete Mosaic, in THE 
ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO BORDER STUDIES 665-681 (Doris Wastl-Walter ed., 2011). 





A.  The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries 
 
 In accordance with LOSC, where overlapping claims to territorial seas out to 
12nm exist, Article 15 applies.45  This article provides that, failing agreement between 
the States, delimitation should be the equidistance or median line,46 defined as a line 
“every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the [territorial sea] 
baselines.” 47   A median or equidistance line is, therefore, a geometrically exact 
expression of the mid-line concept.48  Article 15 of LOSC offers a clear preference 
for the use of equidistance as a method of delimitation for the territorial sea.  
Departure from the median line may, however, be justified on the basis of the 
existence of an “historic title or other special circumstances” in the area to be 
delimited. 49   This approach has been termed the “equidistance/special 
circumstances” method of delimitation by international courts and tribunals.50  The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also stated that Article 15 “is part of 
customary [international] law.”51 
 
 Under the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, delimitation of the 
continental shelf was also to be effected by the use of median lines, unless agreement 
to the contrary or “special circumstances” existed that justified an alternative 
approach. 52   UNCLOS III witnessed a lack of consensus on the inclusion of 
equidistance as a preferred method of delimitation for the continental shelf and 
EEZ.  This lack of consensus translated into the ambiguous wording contained in 
LOSC.  Articles 74 and 83 of the LOSC deal, respectively, with delimitation of the 
continental shelf and EEZ.  Both articles call for agreement to be reached on the 
basis of international law in order to achieve “an equitable solution.”53  No preferred 
method of delimitation is indicated.  Instead, all potentially relevant circumstances 
are to be weighed within the delimitation equation with the objective of achieving an 
equitable result. 
                                                 
45  LOSC, supra note 23, at art. 3 (provides that states have the right to establish a territorial 
sea “not exceeding 12 nautical miles” measured from its baselines.  Article 15 of LOSC represents a 
near verbatim repetition of Article 12 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone).  See id. at art. 12, 15. 
46  The terms “equidistance line” and “median line” are used interchangeably in the present 
context although it is recognised that the latter terms is more commonly applied to equidistance lines 
between opposite coastlines.  
47  LOSC, supra note 23, at art. 15. 
48  Chris Carleton and Clive Schofield, Developments in the Technical Determination of Maritime 
Space: Delimitation, Dispute Resolution, Geographical Information Systems and the Role of the Technical Expert, in 
MARITIME BRIEFING, 3, 4 and 7 (2002).  See also S.W. Boggs, Problems of Water-Boundary Definition: 
Median Lines and International Boundaries through Territorial Waters, 17 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 3, 
445-456 (July 1937); R.D. Hodgson and E.J. Cooper, The Technical Delimitation of a Modern Equidistant 
Boundary, 3 OCEAN DEV. AND INT’L L. 361-388 (1976). 
49  LOSC, supra note 23, at art. 15. 
50  See also Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 303, para. 288 [hereinafter Cameroon/Nigeria Case]. 
51  Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and 
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr (Merits) 2001 I.C.J. 40, para. 175, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/87/7027.pdf. 
52  See CTSCZ, supra note 18, at art. 6. 
53  LOSC, supra note 23, at arts. 74, 83. 




 The marked shift away from equidistance as a preferred method of 
delimitation, at least in the first instance, can be largely attributable to the ICJ’s ruling 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases of 1969.54  In this instance, although the 
ICJ noted that a median line between opposite States usually resulted in an equal 
division of the maritime space involved, 55  and that the majority of maritime 
boundary agreements at the time were based on the equidistance principle, 56 the 
Court concluded that the provisions relating to equidistance in the 1958 Conventions 
had not become part of customary international law and therefore were not 
obligatory.57  
 
 International courts and tribunals have termed the method of delimitation 
applicable to EEZ and continental shelf delimitation, as contained in Articles 74 and 
83 (and in customary international law), as the equitable principles/relevant 
circumstances method.  For example, in the Cameroon/Nigeria Case the ICJ stated 
explicitly that, “[t]he Court has on various occasions made it clear what the 
applicable criteria, principles and rules of delimitation are when a line covering 
several zones of coincident jurisdictions is to be determined.  They are expressed in 
the so-called equitable principles/relevant circumstances method.”58   
 
 The vague nature of these articles, which were among the last to be agreed 
upon at UNCLOS III, resulted from disagreement between the negotiating States.  
The difference of view was essentially between two camps – whilst some States 
preferred an “equidistance/special circumstances” rule, others favoured delimitation 
on the basis of “principles of equity.”  The end result was compromise text that 
places particular emphasis on the objective of the delimitation, utilising an alternative 
form of words not reflective of either side’s view and thus acceptable to both.59  As 
the Arbitral Tribunal in the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration observed in reference to 
Article 83, this was “a last minute endeavour…to get agreement on a very 




                                                 
54  North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic 
of Germany/Netherlands), 1969, I.C.J. 3, para. 101, [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf Cases]. 
55  Id. at para. 57. 
56  Id. at para. 75.  In particular, the examples drawn from State practice cited by the parties 
to the dispute and concluded following the signature of the 1958 Convention on the Continental 
Shelf.  
57  Id. at paras. 70-82 and 101(a).  Indeed, the Court asserted that there was “not a shred of 
evidence” that the States that had agreed to equidistance-based maritime boundary agreements had 
done so because they “believed themselves to be applying a mandatory rule of customary international 
law.”  Id. at para. 76. 
58  Cameroon/Nigeria Case, supra note 50, at para. 288. 
59   Robert Beckman & Clive Schofield, Moving Beyond Disputes over Island Sovereignty: ICJ 
Decision Sets Stage for Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Singapore Strait, 40 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 11-
12 (2009).  
60  Arbitration between Eritrea and Yemen, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage of the 
Proceedings (Maritime Delimitation), Award of 17 December 1999, para. 116, available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160. 





B.  Increasing Clarity? 
 
 Although the provisions of Articles 74 and 83 of LOSC are less than specific, 
some guidance on maritime boundary delimitation can be gleaned from an 
examination of how, over time, international courts and tribunals have approached 
this challenge.  Increasingly, international jurisprudence has tended to favour the 
construction of an equidistance line as a preliminary stage and then consider ways in 
which this line should be amended or shifted in order to achieve an equitable result.  
 
 From a relatively early date the Court has not been averse to using the 
equidistance method as a basis or starting point for maritime delimitation.  For 
example, in the case between Malta and Libya in 1985, the ICJ referred back to its 
1969 North Sea decision elaborating that as the Court was faced with a delimitation 
exclusively between opposite States: 
 
It is clear that, in these circumstances, the tracing of a 
median line between those coasts, by way of a 
provisional step in a process to be continued by other 
operations, is the most judicious manner of 
proceeding with a view to the eventual achievement 
of an equitable result.  But that this...should not be 
understood as implying that an equidistance line will 
be an appropriate beginning in all cases, or even in all 
cases of delimitation between opposite States.61 
 
Similarly, in the Gulf of Maine Case, a median line was selected as a starting point for 
delimitation in the central portion of the Gulf between opposite coasts and later 
altered in light of other factors.   
 
 The two-stage approach to maritime boundary delimitation, that is, drawing a 
provisional line based on equidistance and then considering factors that might lead 
to an adjustment of that line, was applied in the Jan Mayen Case (concerning maritime 
delimitation between Greenland and Jan Mayen Island),62 in the Qatar/Bahrain Case,63 
in the Cameroon/Nigeria Case,64 and in the Guyana/Suriname Arbitration.65  For example, 
                                                 
61  Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment of 3 
June 1985, [1985] ICJ Reports,13, [hereinafter Libya/Malta Case], para. 107, available at www.icj-cij.org, 
para. 62.  
62  Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen 
(Denmark v. Norway), [1993] ICJ Reports, 38 [hereinafter Jan Mayen Case].  See also http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=e0&case=78&code=gjm&p3=4 at para. 51. 
63  See Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and 
Bahrain, (Bahrain Case) at para. 230, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/87/11055.pdf. 
64  Cameroon/Nigeria Case, supra note 50, at para. 288.  See also In the Matter of the Arbitration 
between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago (Apr. 11, 2006), in 45 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 800 
at para. 242. [hereinafter, Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration]; MARITIME POLITICAL 
BOUNDARIES, supra note 32, at 240-41. 
65  Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in accordance with Annex VII, 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration between 
2012 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 1:1 
 
 52 
in the Cameroon/Nigeria Case the Court found that the equitable principles/relevant 
circumstances method was applicable to the delimitation of “coincident 
jurisdictions” of EEZ and continental shelf between the parties.  The Court noted 
that this approach was “very similar” to the equidistance/special circumstances 
method for the delimitation of the territorial sea and consisted of66 “first drawing an 
equidistance line, then considering whether there are factors calling for the 
adjustment or shifting of that line in order to achieve an “equitable result.”67  
 
 This approach was developed further in the ICJ’s ruling in the Black Sea Case 
of February 2009. 68   In the Black Sea Case the Court articulated a three-stage 
approach to the delimitation of a maritime boundary.  First, and “[i]n keeping with 
its settled jurisprudence on maritime delimitation,”69 a provisional delimitation line 
should be established using geometrically objective methods.70  In this context, it was 
stated that “an equidistance line will be drawn unless there are compelling reasons that make 
this unfeasible in the particular case.”71  This explicit preference for an equidistance line 
as the starting point for maritime delimitation marks a significant development as it 
contrasts with previous, rather more circumspect, statements on the part of the 
Court on this issue.  For example, in the Court’s judgment in the Nicaragua/Honduras 
Case of 2007, the Court referred to the wide use of equidistance lines in the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries and the merits, or “certain intrinsic value,” of 
this method of delimitation on account of its “scientific character and the relative 
ease with which it can be applied.”72  However, the Court reached the conclusion 
that “the equidistance method does not automatically have priority over other 
methods of delimitation” as “there may be factors which make the application of the 
equidistance method inappropriate.”73  
 
 Once a provisional, equidistance-based, delimitation line has been 
established, at the second stage the Court is to assess “whether there are factors 
calling for the adjustment or shifting of the provisional equidistance line in order to 
achieve an equitable result.”74  The third stage outlined by the Court in the Black Sea 
                                                                                                                                     
Guyana and Suriname, Award of the Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Sept. 17, 2007), 
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1147. 
66  Id. 
67  Id. 
68  Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) (Feb. 3, 
2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14987.pdf [hereinafter Black Sea Case]. 
69  Id. at para. 118. 
70  Id. at para. 116. 
71  Black Sea Case, supra note 68 at para. 116 (emphasis added).  It can, however, be observed 
that the provisional equidistance line drawn by the Court in the Black Sea Case is not, in fact, a strict 
equidistance line as Serpents’ Island was discounted as a basepoint on the basis that to count Serpents’ 
Island as a relevant part of the coast would be judicial refashioning of geography, which neither the 
law nor practice of maritime delimitation authorizes.”  Id. at para. 149. 
72  Case Concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in 
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Oct. 8, 2007, at para. 272, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=14&case=120&code=nh&p3=4. 
73  Id. (emphasis added). 
74  Black Sea Case, supra note 68, at para. 120.  At this point, the Court cited its earlier 
Judgment in the Cameroon/Nigeria Case in support of its ruling.  See Cameroon/Nigeria Case, supra note 
50, at para. 288. 





Case, involved the verification of the  resulting potential delimitation line, which may 
or may not have been adjusted, through what the Court termed a “disproportionality 
test”75 in order to ascertain that it,  
 
…does not, as it stands, lead to an inequitable result by 
reason of any marked disproportion between the ratio 
of the respective coastal lengths and the ratio between 
the relevant maritime area of each State by reference to 
the delimitation line.  A final check for an equitable 
outcome entails a confirmation that no great 
disproportionality of maritime areas is evident by 
comparison to the ratio of coastal lengths.76 
 
The Court did, however, take care to assert that this (dis)proportionality test “is not 
to suggest that these respective areas should be proportionate to coastal lengths.”77  
When it came to applying the “disproportionality test” in the context of the Black Sea 
Case the Court noted that such a check “can only be approximate” in light of the 
“[d]iverse techniques” that can be used to assess coastal lengths and the lack of clear 
requirements in international law as to whether the “real” coastline or baselines are 
to be followed or whether coasts relating to internal waters should be excluded.78  
The Court found that the ratio of relevant coastal lengths for Romania and Ukraine 
was approximately 1:2.8, that the ratio of relevant maritime areas of the order of 
1:2.1.79   The Court concluded that this difference between the ratio of relevant 
coastal lengths and maritime areas did not constitute a disproportion and that 
consequently no further adjustment to the delimitation line was required at the third 
stage.80 
 
 The three-stage process through which maritime boundary delimitation can 
be achieved, as established by the ICJ in the Black Sea Case, marks the Court’s clearest 
expression yet of its approach to the delimitation of maritime boundaries.  This 
approach represents a development from previous judgments, both in terms of its 
emphasis on equidistance as the method of constructing the provisional delimitation 
line and in its outlining of a three-stage process, as opposed to the two-stage 
approach that had previously been adopted by the Court.  It is also worth noting, 
though, that the unanimity of the Court in the Black Sea Case invests the decision 
with considerable weight. 81   This trend was reinforced by the ruling of the 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in its delimitation of an EEZ 
and continental shelf boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of 
                                                 
75  Black Sea Case, supra note 68, at paras. 122, 210-16. 
76  Id. at paras. 122, 214-15. 
77  Id. The Court reinforced this statement by quoting from its Judgment in the Jan Mayen 
Case.  “[T]he sharing out of the areas should be proportionate to coastal lengths – not vice versa.”  Jan 
Mayen Case, supra note 62, at para. 64. 
78  Black Sea Case, supra note 68, at para. 212. 
79  Id. at para. 215. 
80  Id. at para. 216. 
81  Id. at para. 219. 
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Bengal on 14 March 2012 where the three-stage equidistance/special circumstances 
approach developed by the ICJ in the context of the Black Sea Case was adopted.82   
 
 Ultimately, in light of the inherent advantages of equidistance as a method of 
delimitation (though by no means in all cases), as outlined above, the ICJ’s essential 
return to equidistance as the preferred method of, or at least starting point for, 
delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, as evidenced through the ICJ’s ruling 
in the Black Sea Case, should come as no surprise.  Further, this reliance on 
equidistance lines is consistent with State practice as the equidistance method has 
proved more popular than any alternative method by far and most agreed maritime 
boundaries are based on some form of equidistance.83 
 
III.  ENDURING ISSUES 
 
 The Black Sea Case and preceding decisions in the same vein offer a welcome 
degree of clarity in the maritime delimitation process.  This also promises greater 
consistency and predictability in future international judicial rulings – something 
arguably lacking in the past.84  Nevertheless, a number of problematic issues remain 
which are likely to forestall the rapid completion of the network of boundary lines 
on the maritime political map of the world.  Key impediments to maritime boundary 
delimitation include: the unclear and legally dubious character of some claims to 
maritime jurisdiction, excessive claims to straight baselines, and disputes involving 
islands. 
 
A.  Ambit, Ambiguous and Problematic Claims 
 
 One notable obstacle to maritime boundary delimitation is that many 
maritime claims remain ill-defined.  Only rarely do coastal States provide unilateral 
definitions as to the precise extent of their maritime jurisdictional claims.  Instead, 
many States simply advance maritime claims according to the maximum breadth of 
the particular maritime claims, for instance to a 200nm breadth EEZ.  This general 
lack of precision regarding the exact dimensions of maritime claims and therefore the 
scope of overlapping maritime zones necessarily leads to maritime jurisdictional 
uncertainty. 
 
                                                 
82  Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. Myanmar) (Mar. 14, 2012), International Tribunal on 
the Law of the Sea, Case no.16, at para. 240, available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=108. 
83  For example, with respect to delimitations between opposite coastal States it has been 
estimated that 89% of agreements concluded were based on some form of equidistance.  The figure 
does, however, drop to 38% when adjacent State delimitation is considered.  See Leonard Legault, & 
Blair Hankey, Method, Oppositeness and Adjacency, and Proportionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in 1 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 203, 214 (Jonathan Charney & Lewis Alexander eds., 
1993). 
84  For example, past ICJ boundary decisions have been sharply criticised for advancing 
“numerous approaches, rules and concepts” but failing to articulate clear principles, instead producing 
“a bewildering array of quasi-principles”, leading to considerable uncertainty.  See Ian Townsend-
Gault, Maritime Boundaries in the Arabian Gulf, in THE RAZOR’S EDGE: INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES 
AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 223, 224-27 (Clive Schofield et al. eds., 2002). 





 A further type of problematic maritime claims are those based on alleged 
historic rights.  The validity of such claims to ”historic waters” is often highly 
uncertain.  Indeed, the only mention of this type of claim in LOSC is a reference to 
“so-called” historic bays – language which hardly constitutes a resounding 
endorsement of the concept.85   In this context, the United States has taken the 
restrictive view that: “[t]o meet the international standard for establishing a claim to 
historic waters, a State must demonstrate its open, effective, long-term, and 
continuous exercise of authority over the body of water, coupled with acquiescence 
by foreign States to the exercise of that authority.”86  A prominent example in this 
regard, though by no means the only one, is provided by China’s apparent claims to 
large parts of the South China Sea, allegedly on historic grounds.87 
 
B.  Excessive Baselines 
 
 LOSC was successful in providing a clear spatial framework for coastal State 
maritime claims, and coastal States predominantly make claims in line with the terms 
of the Convention, at least as far as the breadth of maritime zones is concerned.  
However, where maritime claims are to be measured, baselines along the coast then 
become a key concern.  Indeed, such baselines are also frequently crucial to the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries.  This is the case because baselines have a direct 
bearing on the construction of an accurate equidistance or median line and, as noted, 
the majority of maritime boundaries concluded to date have been based on 
equidistance. 
 
 Although the predominant types of baselines in international practice are 
“normal” baselines coincident with “the low-water line along the coast as marked on 
large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State,”88 LOSC allows for a 
number of other types of straight-line type baselines to be constructed along the 
coast.  These include straight baselines (LOSC, Article 7), river closing lines (Article 
9), bay closing lines (Article 10), lines related to ports and roadsteads (Articles 11 and 
12), and in respect of archipelagic states (Article 47). Among these, the provisions 
related to straight baselines have proved to be the most open to flexible 
                                                 
85  This has led one leading law of the sea scholar to term historic waters “an orphaned 
offshore international legal regime” on account of the fact that they were left out of both the 1958 
Conventions and LOSC.  See Ted McDorman, Notes on the Historic Waters Regime and the Bay of Fundy, in 
THE FUTURE OF OCEAN REGIME BUILDING: ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON 701, 
701-22 (Aldo Chircop, et al. eds., 2009). 
86  ROACH & SMITH, supra note 27, at 31. 
87  It should be noted that considerable uncertainty surrounds the meaning of China’s nine-
dashed claim line in the South China Sea.  See Li Jinming & Li Dexia, The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map 
of the South China Sea: A Note, 34 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 287 (2003); Zou Keyuan, The Chinese 
Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South China Sea and Its Legal Consequences for the Resolution of the 
Dispute over the Spratly Islands, 14 INT’L J. OF MARINE AND COASTAL L. 52 (1997); and Kuan-Hsiung 
Wang, The ROC’s Maritime Claims and Practices with Special Reference to the South China Sea, 41 OCEAN 
DEV. & INT’L L. 237-252 (2010). 
88  LOSC, supra note 23, at art. 5. 
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interpretation and thus suffer the most abuse.89  Excessive baselines claims tend to 
capture or enclose overly large marine spaces as internal waters and simultaneously 
advance the claimant State’s starting point for measuring its maritime claims and also 
have the potential to inequitably influence the course of a potential maritime 
boundary based on equidistance.  Disagreements over baselines are therefore 
frequently a notable dimension of maritime boundary disputes.  
 
C.  Islands 
 
 A further frequent source of maritime jurisdictional disputes relates to 
islands.  Such disputes broadly fall into two intrinsically interlinked categories – 
sovereignty disputes over islands and disputes related to their associated maritime 
spaces.  Within the latter category of disputes a critical issue that frequently arises 
relates to the capacity of particular insular features to generate extensive claims to 
maritime jurisdiction.  In keeping with the Regime of Islands, as provided by Article 
121 of LOSC, an island consists of “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by 
water, which is above water at high tide.”90  In principle such features are to be 
treated just as any other land territory and therefore generate the full suite of 
maritime claims.91  However, LOSC Article 121(3) states that “[r]ocks which cannot 
sustain human habitation or an economic life of their own shall have no exclusive 
economic zone or continental shelf.”  This distinction between islands capable of 
generating extended claims to maritime jurisdiction and a disadvantaged sub-category 
of island, the “rock,” has enormous implications in terms of potential maritime 
claims.  If an island had no maritime neighbours within 400nm, it could generate 
125,664 square nm (431,014km2) of territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf rights.  
In stark contrast, if deemed a mere “rock” incapable of generating EEZ and 
continental shelf rights, a territorial sea of 452 sq. nautical miles (1,550km2) could be 
claimed.92  To date no conclusive means by which to distinguish between islands 
capable of generating extended maritime claims (that is, to EEZ and continental 
shelf rights), and mere “rocks” which cannot, has emerged.  In the context of 
maritime boundary delimitation and disputes, small insular features and their capacity 
to generate extensive maritime claims, and therefore act as a valid base-point in the 
construction of an EEZ or continental shelf boundary, is often a key consideration 
and point of contention.  That said, there is arguably an increasingly clear trend for 
small islands, often sparsely inhabited or uninhabited and located far offshore, to be 
awarded a much reduced capacity to generate maritime claims and to influence the 
course of maritime boundaries.  
 
  
                                                 
89  See generally ROACH & SMITH, supra note 27.  See also J. Ashley Roach & Robert Smith, 
Straight Baselines: The Need for a Universally Applied Norm, 31 INT’L J. MARINE AND COASTAL L. 47-80 
(2000). 
90  LOSC, supra note 23, at art. 121(1). 
91  Id. at art. 121(2). 
92  For the sake of this theoretical calculation the features in question are assumed to have no 
land area. 





D.  Continuing Jurisdictional Creep 
 
 As noted above, the maritime political map of the world is relatively stable 
with regard to the spatial extent of maritime jurisdictional claims and LOSC can be 
regarded as a triumph in this regard.  Nonetheless, the issue of “creeping coastal 
jurisdiction” remains.  
 
 While the breadth of coastal State claims has to a large extent been 
constrained and contained by the framework established under LOSC, States have 
nonetheless sought to secure additional rights within their national zones and, 
increasingly, in areas beyond national jurisdiction.  Such additional national 
jurisdictional rights over maritime spaces are often claimed on maritime security and 
environmental grounds.  With regard to the former concern, it has been noted that 
there exists a temptation for States to use the 200nm EEZ limit as the basis for 
boarding rights, justified on the basis of contemporary security threats such as 
maritime terrorism, leading to “further territorialisation of the EEZ.”93  In a similar 
vein, some coastal States have sought to restrict certain activities in “their” waters, 
asserting, for example, rights over the passage of foreign military vessels through 
their waters and claiming the right to prohibit activities such as exercises or survey 
activities, including hydrographic surveying, within their EEZs without permission.  
Such claims have been resisted and protested by other States and this has, on 
occasion, resulted in incidents such as that involving the USS Impeccable, an unarmed 
United States Navy surveillance vessel, which in March 2009 was harassed by 
multiple Chinese civilian and naval vessels with the objective of forcing the U.S. ship 
to withdraw from China’s EEZ.94 
 
 It has further been observed that coastal States have also been keen to assert 
additional controls offshore on environmental grounds, for instance in respect of the 
transport of hazardous materials95 and in the wake of the loss of the Prestige oil tanker 
off the north-western coast of Spain and the resulting oil pollution along those 
shores, in November 2002.96  This represents a significant challenge to the delicate 
balance of rights, responsibilities, and freedoms contained in LOSC and thus a threat 
to the stable oceans regime vital to ensuring the freedom of navigation necessary for 
global trade.  
 
IV.  BEYOND BOUNDARIES 
 
 Claims to maritime jurisdiction have advanced offshore to encompass great 
swaths of the world ocean – indeed, an area approximately equivalent to the world’s 
land territory.  This vast extension in coastal State rights has generated a large 
                                                 
93  See Bernard Oxman, The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 THE AM. J. INT’L L. 
842 (2006); see also ROACH & SMITH, supra note 27, at 409-421. 
94  The incident took place approximately 75 miles south of Hainan Island, well beyond 
China’s territorial waters, but within its 200nm EEZ.  See Ian Townsend-Gault & Clive Schofield, 
Hardly Impeccable Behaviour: Confrontations Between Foreign Ships and Coastal States in the EEZ, 5 INT’L 
ZEITSCHRIFT 1 (Apr. 2009), http://www.zeitschrift.co.uk/indexv5n1.html. 
95  Id. at 421-423. 
96  Oxman, supra note 93, at 847-848. 
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number of overlapping maritime claims, potential boundaries and, inevitably, 
disputes.  Despite the substantial progress that has undoubtedly been made in terms 
of the delimitation of maritime boundaries, to date less than half have been settled.  
The increasing clarity that is emerging in international ocean boundary law, as 
evidenced by the ICJ’s ruling in the Black Sea Case, offers the prospect that maritime 
boundary disputes will be more readily settled in the future than has been the case 
heretofore.  That said, it is also clear that key impediments to the rapid delimitation 
of maritime boundaries remain.  It can further be observed that the process of 
‘maritime jurisdictional creep’ is far from over, both in the spatial extent of claims as 
extended continental shelf areas are finalised and with respect to the rights claimed 
and asserted by States within their maritime zones.  
 
 It is also worth emphasising that while maritime boundary delimitation is 
clearly the preferred option of coastal States to define the limits of their maritime 
entitlements where they have the potential to overlap with the claims of other States, 
it is neither the only way to address this situation, nor is it the end of the process.  
Increasingly, maritime joint development zones have been applied to areas of 
overlapping maritime claims, often in lieu of delimiting a maritime boundary.  
Further, the delimitation of a maritime boundary, or, indeed, the creation of a 
maritime joint development zone, only represents an initial, albeit useful, step 
towards enhanced oceans management.  Such delimitations may well deliver clarity 
and certainty to all maritime states and users and thereby help to minimise the risk of 
friction and conflict by eliminating a source of bi-lateral and multilateral disputes.  
However, they only provide the framework for the effective management of the 
inevitably fluid marine environment and its resources.  Ultimately, therefore, while it 
can be argued that the delimitation of international maritime boundaries is an 
essential component of a stable maritime regime and good oceans governance, 
transboundary cooperation is also required to realise comprehensive maritime 
resource and environmental stewardship. 
 
 
 
